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ABSTRACT 
Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly 
pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market 
failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of 
bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure 
major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are 
reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for 
major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of 
competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).  
INTRODUCTION 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been widely implemented on the 
premise of delivering value-for-money (VfM) in the procurement of major 
infrastructure. However, due to the financial and technical prequalification 
requirements, PPPs often operate in oligopolistic or monopolistic markets, in which 
there are a limited number of bidders (De Valence 2003, 2012; Thu & Akintoye 
2007). In a review of studies on market share in the construction industry, De 
Valence (2012, p. 31) found that in countries such as Australia, South Korea, Japan, 
Hong Kong and the United Kingdom (UK), there were a plethora of small firms 
whereby their markets exhibited the features of perfect competition and a small 
number of large contractors, and in some instances accounted for up to 70% of 
turnover, which mimicked the characteristics of an oligopoly. 
More specifically, De Valence (2012) concluded that large head contractors in 
the engineering construction and non-residential building sectors, and subcontractors 
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that supply lifts and building automation systems exhibit characteristics of 
oligopolistic competition. Furthermore, Thu and Akintoye (2007) examined the four-
firm concentration ratio (CR4) present within the PPP/Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) UK market as fifty percent or more in most subsectors such as transport and 
health sectors. The CR4 is a common tool for analysing the types of market structure 
and can be used as a measure of competition (Scherer & Ross 1990). The CR4 is 
computed as the percentage of market share held by the four largest firms in the 
industry. The results show that almost all sub-sectors within the UK PPP/PFI 
construction market can be considered medium concentration or an oligopoly market. 
As a result this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and competition. In 
accordance with Neoclassical Economics, non-competitive markets with limited 
competitors can lead to an unbalanced allocation of goods and services, which is 
referred to as Pareto inefficiency (Kaufman 2011). Competition drives down 
marginal costs and creates downward pressure on price, as well as facilitating 
innovations in design, based on outcome-based specifications that impinge on the 
time, cost and quality of the project, and which influence the overall performance of 
the project across its life-cycle. With lower competitive tension in the market, there 
is a lack of incentives for contractors to be innovative in order to be price 
competitive, and which can affect the performance across the whole-of-life of the 
asset. On the other hand, empirical evidence from construction procurement shows 
that a high level of competition or aggressive bidding is associated with opportunistic 
behaviour in complex projects or market failure post-contract (Sweeney 2009). 
This paper aims to derive an optimal level of competition in the procurement of 
major infrastructure from the literature, that is, a lower limit of competition level that 
avoids ineffective competition ex ante and at the same time, an upper limit of 
competition that avoids negative opportunistic behaviour ex post. This is achieved by 
reviewing and integrating literature related to competition; the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) paradigm; tendering perspectives based on Game Theory and 
Auction Theory; and negative opportunistic behaviour within the lens of Transaction 
Cost Economics. 
STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE  
The notion that competition can be driven by a small number of firms 
(oligopoly) originated from Chamberlin’s (1933) seminal work in formulating the 
theory of monopolistic competition. Also closely related to Chamberlin’s work, 
Clark (1940) developed the concept of “workable competition” or optimal 
competition that seeks to avoid the extreme forms of imperfect competition, which is 
either too weak or strong. Clark (1940) further describes workability as somewhere 
between “pure oligopoly, and the ruinously low prices likely to result from unlimited 
market chaos: more strongly competitive than the first, and more workable than the 
second” (p.253). The latter scenario often known as ‘destructive, ruinous, chaotic or 
cut-throat competition’ can occur in an oligopoly where the overhead costs are high 
and marginal costs are low. During cyclical or stand-by excess capacity in which 
demands fall below full-capacity levels, firms are willing to cut price well below an 
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efficient producer's total cost of production. This scenario can be a chronic issue 
especially in industries exhibiting characteristics of imperfect immobility, such as 
bituminous coal mining and agriculture, and Clark (1940) termed these industries as 
“sick industries”. On the other hand, Clark (1940) observed “some of the healthiest 
cases of workable competition in large-scale industry” in oligopolistic industry, such 
as automobile production (p. 256). This provides evidence that effective competition 
can exist amongst a relatively small number of firms. 
Joe S. Bain (1950) takes Clark’s argument further to the industry level and 
explains the relationship between the patterns of competitive behaviour and 
oligopoly market structure in terms of conditions of entry and market concentration. 
Based on Bain’s prognosis (p. 46), oligopolies with moderate difficulties to entry and 
concentration of sellers, generally display the closest approximation to workability. 
These oligopolies display reasonable efficiency, with low or moderate prices and 
profits. Essentially, under difficult and moderate market entry conditions, established 
firms will set prices low enough to prevent new entry and maintain reasonable 
efficiency in scale and capacity in the long-run, whereas the prospect of long-run 
efficiency is less certain under easy entry (p. 42). In terms of market concentration, 
ceteris paribus , a large proportion of the market controlled by a “very few large 
firms and smaller firms are absent or small in number” (p. 43), that is high market 
concentration, do not display workability; whereas, a moderate proportion of the 
market controlled by a similar number of large firms, and a greater number of small 
to medium sized firms holding the balance of the market share, that is moderate 
market concentration may be argued to display quasi competitive behaviour, such as 
imperfect collusion or kinked demand curve conformations. Bain Joe Staten Bain 
(1951, p. 44) proposes eight-firm market concentration of 65 to 75 percent as a 
dividing line to differentiate between effective and ineffective competition in loose 
and tight oligopoly respectively. 
Market structures can be classified based on the degree of competitiveness in 
the market; using information such as market share (Shepherd 1982). Shepherd 
(1990, p. 14) classifies six types of market structures into two categories of 
competition: 1) ineffective and 2) effective. Market structures under ineffective 
competition are characterised by high market concentration, such as: (1) monopoly 
(one firm has 100 percent market share); (2) dominant firm (one firm has 40 percent 
to 99 percent market share); and (3) tight oligopoly (four firms have over 60 percent 
market share). Under effective competition, firms are not able to control prices, little 
collusion and low profit rates (Shepherd 1982, p. 617). There are three market types 
under effective competition: (1) loose oligopoly (four firms have less than 40 percent 
market share): (2) monopolistic competition (many competitors each with a slight 
degree of market power); and (3) pure competition (many competitors, none of 
whom has market power). Based on the above, firms that operate in an oligopoly 
market can be in healthy competition. This has implications on infrastructure 
procurement, in terms of the extent of bundling and sizing of infrastructure projects, 
in order to generate effective competition within the limits of optimal competition. 
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Next, given that sealed bid auctions aim to increase competitive tension in the 
procurement process, the following section studies auction theory or game theory 
literature related to competitive bidding and the effects of the number of bidders on 
value of bids. 
AUCTION THEORY AND GAME THEORY 
In the study of auctions and bids, there are two dominant approaches based on 
the assumptions of maximising expected profits: (1) decision-theoretic approach 
(Carr 1982; Friedman 1956; Gates 1967; Skitmore 1991, 2013) and the (2) game 
theoretic approach (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, & Weber 1983; Milgrom 1989; 
Milgrom & Weber 1982; Riley & Samuelson 1981; Rothkopfm 1969; Vickrey 1961; 
Wilson 1977). The decision-theoretic approach determines a satisfactory balance 
between the probability of winning a contract and the profit generated as a result of 
winning the contract. It is assumed that the bidders compete by applying a strategic 
mark-up, that is, a percentage mark-up to the estimated true cost of the project to 
form the bid value. The focus is on forecasting the distribution of bids, and 
determining optimal bidding by “the product of the probability of winning the 
contract and the profit generated as a result of winning the contract (Skitmore & 
Pemberton 1994, p. 1263).” The other approach – game theoretic approach – is based 
on the study of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, by modelling sealed bid auctions as 
non-cooperative games with incomplete information, and derives equilibrium 
bidding strategies with the assumptions that all bidders bid optimally. Game theorists 
have shown that aggressive bidding is associated with increasing number of bidders 
and reducing the value of bids (e.g., Bajari 2001; Bajari, Houghton, & Tadelis 2014) 
and similarly, empirical studies on tendering in the construction industry show a 
correlation between a greater number of bidders and a reduction in the value of the 
lowest bid, and which is consistent with neoclassical economics (e.g., Brannman, 
Klein, & Weiss 1987; Domberger & Rimmer 1994; McCaffer 1979; Ngai, Drew, Lo, 
& Skitmore 2002; Skitmore 2002). 
In terms of optimal competition, Chamberlin (1933) did not specify what is 
considered to be a “small” and “large” number of firms. Within the game theory 
literature however, the focus has been on determining the lower limit of competition, 
that is, the minimum number of firms needed to generate effective competition. 
Selten (1973) was first to demonstrate that five competitors represent the dividing 
line between few and many, when modelled as moves in a non-cooperative game. 
Subsequent to Selten’s influential work, Kagel and Levin’s (1986) experiments 
indicate that auctions with 6 to 7 bidders (many) generate greater competition than 
with 3 to 4 bidders (small). Based on a review of empirical research and experiments, 
Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004) report that 4 and more firms are never 
collusive (either competitive or at Nash equilibrium); 2 is highly collusive, and 3 has 
reached Nash equilibrium. The literature has indicated that a minimum of 5 
competitors is enough to exert high competitive pressure in the market (e.g., Huck et 
al. 2004; Kahn 2006; Selten 1973). As there are increased opportunities for 
interactions amongst firms (multi-market contacts) with repeated games or auctions, 
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this may create opportunities for collusion. In other words, game theorists argue that 
cooperation or collusive behaviour is considered difficult to sustain at 5 or more 
competitors, even in repeated games (Huck et al. 2004, p. 436). As such, this 
demonstrates that when four or less firms compete in a market, it creates tight 
oligopoly market conditions and associated pricing constraints, along with 
ineffective competition (Beattie, Goodacre, & Fearnley 2003; Shepherd 1982). More 
importantly, five competitors or bidders are derived as the lower limit of optimal 
competition (Huck et al. 2004; Kagel & Levin 1986; Selten 1973). 
On the other hand, game theorists have also indicated the idea of upper limit of 
optimal competition, that is, perfect competition or intense competition leads to the 
convergence of the true value of the object, even when bidders have incomplete 
information about its value (Milgrom 1979; Wilson 1977). Capen, Clapp, and 
Campbell (1971) explain that when the potential competition is large, the winning 
firm is likely to have underestimated the value and as a result suffers from negative 
profits. This phenomenon is known as the winner’s curse and mainly occurs in 
common-value settings 1 (such as bridge construction) (Bajari & Hortacsu 2003; 
Hong & Shum 2002; Kagel & Levin 1986; Thaler 1988; Thiel 1988). In common 
value settings, bidders only have estimates of the project, and rational firms will not 
bid as aggressively when there are many potential competitors (Barrus & Scott 2013, 
p. 6). In other words, having a large or excessive number of bidders does not 
necessarily lead to price reduction in common value auctions. As the final bid price 
is an optimal decision that maximises the bidder’s profits and the chance of winning 
the bid, a larger number of bidders may result in more aggressive bidding behaviour, 
but not at the expense of negative profits. As bidders learn out of “a trial and error 
survival process that is situationally specific” from previous tenders (Kagel & Levin 
1986, p. 901), and gain sufficient experience and feedback regarding the outcomes of 
their previous decisions, bidders will learn to avoid the winner's curse. With adequate 
time, this disequilibrium will correct itself given period (Kagel & Levin 1986, p. 
917). More importantly, game and auction theory have indicated an upper limit to 
competition, beyond which bid value reaches a constant.  
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
In addition to the lack of competition as a factor of market failure, Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) also envisages market failure occurring ex post due to post-
contractual opportunistic behaviour. For instance, asset specificity in construction 
projects tends to be higher post-contract when the investment has been made, and the 
1 Auctions are categorised into private value and common value auctions. In private value auctions, 
bidders know the value of the item (asphalt projects), whereas in common value auctions, the bidders 
only have the estimates of the value of the item (such as bridge projects) (De Silva, Jeitschko, & 
Kosmopoulou 2009; Hong & Shum 2002). 
5 
 
                                               
costs of replacing the main-contractor, subcontractor, or supplier are higher both 
financially and in terms of the implications for project progress. This is in contrast to 
pre-contract when there are plenty of alternative main-contractors, subcontractors, or 
suppliers in the market (Winch 2001). This change to a form of bilateral monopoly 
post-contract is known as ‘fundamental transformation’ (Williamson 1985). The 
more plentiful supply of bidders – the more stark the fundamental transition – and it 
is logical to expect, on average, more bidders in projects that are seen as attractive by 
contractors due to their assessment of the potential for variations, for example arising 
from incomplete documentation including lack of clarity in specifying requirements. 
Projects that are subjected to the dynamics of change and are locked into long-term 
contracts, such as an extremely complex PPP, create opportunities for post-
contractual negative opportunistic behaviour. This can open up opportunities for 
hold-up ex post. For example, Sweeney examines the major infrastructure market in 
Australia and observes that contractors can use low bid tendering strategies to win 
contracts in an extremely competitive market, and adopt a claim strategy resulting in 
high variation claims ex post (Sweeney 2009, p. 141). Amaral, Saussier, and 
Yvrande-Billion (2013) also point out that bidders may bid more aggressively to win 
contracts with a high potential to be renegotiated post-contract, given the chance to 
renegotiate after winning the contract. This shows that the current contracting 
practice could have resulted in ex post market failure, as opportunistic behaviour is 
not uncommon in the construction industry, especially for complex projects 
associated with high uncertainty, and the market can perceive the project to be 
lucrative in terms of a potential for variation claims, and the opportunity to make 
superior profits post-contract (Sweeney 2009).  
Furthermore, research in construction procurement has provided empirical 
evidence of an upper limit of competition. Gupta (2002) examined the effects of the 
number of bidders on bid value based on 1740 highway construction projects in the 
US over a five year period. The empirical results indicate that the absolute level of 
competition creates downward pressure on price. That is, the value of winning bids 
decreases as the number of bidders increases, but the effect on value becomes 
insignificant when the absolute number of bidders reaches a maximum number; in 
other words, a competitive threshold is reached. Gupta determines this competitive 
threshold to be near and up to 8 bidders in an open tender (or equivalent expressions 
of interest). Thus, Gupta (2002) has made the important contribution in terms of 
surfacing an optimal upper level of competition from a production costs and benefits 
perspective. Also highly relevant, Skitmore (2002) analysed ten data sets 
(representing 1,234 projects), this time in a different sector than Gupta and mainly 
from the building industries in various countries, including US, UK and Belgium. 
Skitmore’s (2002) findings are consistent with Gupta’s study, where the regression 
curves show that the value of the lowest bid decreases until eight bidders, and 
remains constant as the number of bidders or competition increases. Skitmore (2002, 
p.16) concludes that there is a tendency for the value of bid to be significantly higher 
than the pretender estimate when the competition is below eight bidders; conversely, 
the value of bid comes close to the pretender estimate or, in some instances, is lower 
than the pretender estimate when the competition is greater than eight bidders.  
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Since production costs and benefits ratio has been shown empirically to 
become negligible greater than eight bidders, then this upper limit can be used to 
assess the efficacy of the project’s specified requirements. In so far as, when tenders 
attract unusually strong interest beyond eight bidders, then this can be an indication 
of a lack of specified requirements and the likelihood of variations leading to ex post 
market failure. Moreover, Skitmore’s (2002) and Gupta’s (2002) empirical evidence 
establishes the validity of using competition as an indicator of testing the goodness of 
a model in terms of setting a project on a path towards delivering superior VfM. On 
this basis, a number of bidders in the range 5 to 8 inclusive is established as a 
suitable dependent variable and proxy for VfM; and an optimal response and 
reflective of the extent to which the procurement of the project has been optimised in 
relation to size, bundling and exchange relationship (Teo 2014). 
In terms of a measure of competition, the extent of anticipated or expected 
competition, rather than the actual competition, is more likely to be a determinant of 
a firm’s bidding strategy in a sealed bid auction. As firms do not know the actual 
number of bidders at the time of preparation of bids in practice, studies on auctions 
have been criticised for assuming that the number of bidders is known (Amaral et al. 
2013). Ngai et al. (2002, p. 475) propose that potential competition is dependent on 
market conditions; a reflection of supply capacity utilization in the industry; and can 
be measured as the “likely number of competitors for projects in the market”. This is 
affirmed by the empirical studies by De Silva et al. (2009) in road construction 
procurement and Amaral et al. (2013) in London bus transport; where their statistical 
analyses indicate that the expected number of bidders is more effective than the 
actual number of bidders in explaining the value of the bids; and bidders appear to be 
more aggressive when the number of expected number of bidders is large. Similarly, 
in terms of PPP procurement, and Teo (2014); Teo, Bridge, and Gray (2013) use the 
number of Expressions of Interest (EoI) to demonstrate the contractor’s willingness 
to bid as a more relevant measure of expected competition. As such, 5 to 8 EoI is 
derived as the optimal level of competition.   
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, a PPP project needs to be sufficiently large to justify leveraging 
private finance but, on the other hand, not too large so as to yield insufficient 
competition, or ex ante market failure arising from small bidding numbers, or 
conditions akin to monopoly supply. At the low level of potential competition or low 
EoI, SCP and game theory have indicated that, 4 or less firms demonstrating their 
willingness to bid for a project creates tight oligopoly conditions and associated 
pricing constraints, along with ineffective competition. As such, 4 or less EoI can be 
used as an early indication of market failure ex ante arising from a lack of 
competition associated with size or level of bundling of the project. At the same time, 
a balance needs to be struck, as too much competition becomes counter-productive 
and can be an indicator of market failure ex post. This is because the market can be 
signalling the prospect of gains arising from poorly specified requirements or a lack 
of predictable requirements, which leads to hold-up arising from variations in the 
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PPP long-term contract. TCE has indicated that high number of bidders or EoIs (over 
8), can be seen as an early indication of market failure ex post arising from the 
prospect of lack of flexibility or possibility of renegotiation;  
As such, 5 to 8 (inclusive) EoI is derived as an optimal level of competition, 
and an early indication of avoiding market failure ex ante arising from a lack of 
competition; and ex post arising from a lack of flexibility. It is expected that projects 
within 5-8 EoI are potentially on a path to superior VfM, whereas projects with sub-
optimal EoI are expected to have room for VfM improvements in their procurement 
dimensions. 5 to 8 EoI is derived as a valid and early indicator of the optimal 
configuration of a project’s key procurement dimensions (including a PPP or non-
PPP approach). Further quantitative and empirical research can be carried out to test 
the reliability of 5-8 EoIs in generating an optimal level of competition in the 
procurement of major infrastructure. 
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